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What motivates eurosceptic voters in net-payer and 
net-receiver EU member states? 
Abstract: 
This paper investigates what motivates four dimensions of Euroscepticism in 28 member states 
of the European Union. The sample is split between net-payer and receiver countries with 
respect to the EU budget. All dimensions of scepticism are found to be heavily concentrated 
among the political left in receiver countries, while both political extremes are more 
instrumentally eurosceptic and dissatisfied with the current EU in payer countries. There is, 
however, an increased probability that the political right in receiver countries will become more 
eurosceptic based on their opposition to immigration. 
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1. Introduction 
The European project is on the verge of collapse. Support for the European Union (EU) has 
been declining steadily and the absence of political support for the Union has been a topic of 
scholarly debate since a long time, grouped under the term “Euroscepticism”. Recent events 
like the Brexit, the EU’s inability to work together in the refugee crisis, and the rise of many 
anti-European movements in different countries make painfully clear that this is a real problem 
which must be addressed to prevent the EU from failing completely. It is evident that the 
European populace is divided along some lines. Which factors exactly determine a person’s 
Euroscepticism, however, is a current topic of interest. Fact is that faced with complicated 
issues like the high influx of refugees into Europe and the consequences of the financial crisis 
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that are still very pronounced in many regions voters seem to have become more receptive to 
the populist message of easy solutions than they have been for a long time. 
The increasing success of Eurosceptic parties poses a real danger to the European project 
and so far, there is no solution in sight. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) have formulated the 
theory of the “sleeping giant”, which postulates that the European populace is indeed divided 
on European issues and that the right political entrepreneur could gather support by making 
these issues more salient to the greater public. There have been various studies that aim at 
explaining public Euroscepticism as well as the role political parties play and their stance on 
European issues. However, most papers have studied either different types of Euroscepticism 
on a sample of a few specific countries, or they have studied general Eurosceptic trends in all 
EU member states. This papers aims to present an integrated approach to the problem by 
including the different concepts of Euroscepticism that have been developed, as well as the 
main explanatory theories. Furthermore, it includes observations from all 28 member countries 
of the EU and accounts for intra country variability by fitting random effects models for the 
respective variables of interest. 
Oftentimes opposition to European integration has been attributed to an individual’s 
ideological stand; both extremes, the ideological left and right are assumed to be more 
Eurosceptic, the left for economic and the right for identity and cultural reasons (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2005; De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Van Elsas, Hakhverdian, & Van der Brug, 2016). 
While several authors have tested interaction effects between left/right placement and various 
other variables, to our knowledge it has not been tested so far how the impact of left/right 
placement differs between European countries. This paper investigates this issue by diferring 




The rest of the paper is organised in the following way. In section 2 an overview of the 
different classifications of Euroscepticism is provided, along with the theoretic underpinnings. 
Third, it presents the main theories that have been used to explain the different forms of 
Euroscepticism and the hypotheses that will be tested thereafter are presented in section four. 
Next, an overview over the data and variables is given, to then, sixth, present the empirical 
analysis. Section 7 discusses the results and the eighth and final one provides a conclusion. 
 
2. Forms of Euroscepticism 
The earlier studies of public opinion on European integration usually focused on what has been 
termed Instrumental Euroscepticism. The metric used to represent this form of scepticism is the 
answer to the question whether a respondent’s country has benefitted from its EU membership, 
or whether its membership is a good or a bad thing. As Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) show, 
there is at least a second dimension to Euroscepticism that varies amongst countries and regions, 
which is labelled Political Euroscepticism. In contrast to Instrumental Euroscepticism it 
measures whether a respondent wants to shift decision making power for a certain policy from 
the European to the national or regional level. 
The first type of Euroscepticism is clearly related to some kind of cost-benefit analysis; 
the respondent is urged to evaluate whether the EU has benefitted his country or is in some way 
good for it. Although it is not specified in the question this type of analysis is usually taken to 
be an economic one (Gabel, 1998; Lubbers et al. 2005), in which an individual thinks about the 
ways in which the EU has economically or financially benefitted his country. The second type 
of Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is not as clearly related to economic issues. Since its 
creation the EU has broadened its scope of government considerably, now encompassing nearly 
every domain of politics. Because of the multitude of policies the EU is or could be involved, 
there are some that generally receive more support for Europeanisation than others. Several 
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different classifications have been put forward as to how policies should grouped, but the tenor 
is that there are some that are “inherently international” and therefore naturally respondents are 
more likely to think they should be decided upon at the European level (Dalton & Eichenberg, 
1998; Gabel & Anderson, 2002; Lubbers et al., 2005; Magalhães, 2012a). Which policies 
exactly belong to that category is up for debate, but some that are consistently mentioned by 
various scholars are Agriculture, Crime, and Environment1. The policies that receive least 
average support for Europeanisation are those that involve high government spending, like 
social programs (Hooghe, 2003). Although these differences in average support exist, it is now 
scientific consensus that an individual that wants to transfer one policy to the European level is 
also more likely to want so for any other policy (Lubbers et al., 2005; Magalhães, 2012b). 
Support for Europeanisation can therefore be taken to be a single dimension, which, according 
to previous research, weakly correlates with Instrumental Euroscepticism. 
These different cosiderations concerning Euroscepticism give rise to two further 
concepts: output-oriented and input-oriented legitimacy. When asked whether its country’s 
membership in the EU is a good thing or not, a respondent is urged to think about what the 
union has done for him or his country, in what ways it has benefitted him. If he thinks the EU 
has had a positive impact on his country, this confirms the EU’s output-oriented legitimacy. On 
the other hand, the decision wether to transfer policy-making powers to the EU hinges on the 
respondent’s opinion on what the EU should be in charge of, without necessarily having proven 
its efficacy in that area. This input-oriented legitimacy is of crucial importance for the future of 
the European project, because the EU can only expand its competencies in areas in which it 
receives public support (Magalhães, 2012a). Because the transfer of political power to the EU 
necessarily involves partly giving up national sovereignty in a wide array of areas, it is likely 
not based on economic but rather political considerations. 
                                                 
1 See Magalhães, 2012b for a summary 
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Most of the recent research on Euroscepticism makes the distinction between these two 
dimensions, although there are various authors that acknowledge the possibility that there might 
be other components of support for the European project that vary independently from these 
two dimensions (Magalhães, 2012a). Van Elsas et al. (2016), for example, use dissatisfaction 
with the EU and opposition to EU strengthening to measure Euroscepticism among the citizens 
of 14 Western European democracies. Dissatisfaction is constructed as a combined index of 
trust in the EU and the EU’s external efficacy and Opposition is based on the question wether 
EU unification has already gone too far or should be pushed further. While these concepts share 
some features with the two previously described, there are some important difference which 
makes it plausible to treat Euroscepticism as a four dimensional. 
Although both Instrumental Euroscepticism and EU Dissatisfaction cause the respondent 
to think about what the EU has achieved for him or his country, the instrumental dimension is 
more general and the design of the question is more likely to cause a cost-benefit analysis. The 
external efficacy part of dissatisfaction is based on the question wether “the European 
Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens”, which, just like trust, is 
more clearly linked to a specific institution of the EU. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine that 
dissatisfaction is based on other cosiderations than purely economic ones. A respondent might 
reasonably think his country’s membership in the EU is a good thing, for example because of 
fiscal transfers, but still distrust the European Parliament, possibly because he thinks that there 
is a democratic deficit and he is not properly represented in that Parliament. Similarly, Political 
Euroscepticism and EU Opposition both cause considerations about the future of the union, but 
while the political dimension asks about specific policies and their Europeanisation, supporting 
further EU strengthening or not refers to some kind of “ideal” EU, likely to be based on 




3. Explaining Euroscepticism 
Euroscepticism amongst political parties has been studied a lot more extensively than amongst 
the public and has repeatefly described as an “inverted U” with the political extremes being 
more Eurosceptic (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; De Vries and Edwards, 2009). This 
division between the political left and right can be expected to be replicated at the individual 
level, because these political dimensions are based on values that constitute part of a certain 
worldview, which can be expected to be shared by parties and individuals. The previously 
mentioned paper, however, investigates only one aspect of Euroscepticism, so the question is 
how ideology affects the four dimensions under scrutiny in this paper. To answer that we must 
analyse how motivations for eurosceptic attitudes differ between left and right-wing voters. 
Left-wing parties traditionally emphasise economic and social issues while they welcom 
multiculturalism. Right-wing parties, on the other hand tend to oppose multiculturalism and 
rally voters based on national identity considerations (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). To assess 
the impact that left/right placement has on the different dimensions of Euroscepticism, one has 
to differentiate between net-payer and net-receiver countries. In line with Van Elsas et al. (2016) 
we hypothesise that the relationship between Instrumental Euroscepticism and EU 
Dissatisaction and left/right placement is curvilinear in net-payer countries. However, we 
expect that citizens on the extreme left score higher on Instrumental Euroscepticism, because 
this is the dimension that is most strongly connected to economic considerations. As explained 
above, dissatifaction might be based on other motivations, so we expect the left and right 
extremes to be equally dissatisfied in net-payer countries. Because of the economic situation 
that most of the net-receiver countries are in, we hypothesise that the left scores higher on both 
dimensions of Euroscepticism. Many of the countries in this group have had to bear strict 
austerity measure imposed by the EU over the last decades. This has caused many citizens to 
blame the union for the dismantling or defunding of many social welfare programs, leading to 
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an increase in perceived clarity of responsibility. Consequently, economic voting against the 
EU has become more salient, causing respondents to base dissatisfaction on economic 
considerations. 
Concerning Political Euroscepticism and EU Opposition, we again follow Van Elsas et 
al. (2016) for net-payer countries. Citizens on the political right are expected to want the EU to 
have less policy making powers and to be more resistant to further unification, because both 
dimensions capture fear of loss of sovereignty, immigration, and multiculturalism. While voters 
on the left perceive the EU as an opportunity to put in place social and redistributive policies 
that they favour, the right perceives it as a threat to their identity and culture. We therefore 
expect a linear relationship between these two dimensions of Euroscepticism and left/right 
placement in net-payer countries. In net-receiver countries, on the other hand, we again must 
take into consideration that economic perceptions are intricatly linked with the EU. Although 
right-wing sentiments against immigrants are on the rise in these countries too, most of the 
opposition to the EU stems from left-wing citizens. It is likely that the continued austerity 
measures that many net-receiver countries had to endure due to the EU have disillusioned voters 
on the left, so that they do not perceive the union as an appropriate instrument to put in place 
their social agenda anymore. Therefore, we hypothesise that the relationship between Political 
Euroscepticism and EU Opposition and left/right placement is curvilinear in net-receiver 
countries, with left-wing citizens scoring higher on both dimensions. 
In addition to the simple left/right placement we introduce two additional ideological 
indicators into the analysis, which are support for redistributive or for anti-immigration policies. 
These items have the advantage that they are independent measurements of socioeconomic and 
cultural attitudes, respectively. Because eurosceptic, populistic parties in many countries aim 
and achieve to draw voters from both extremes of the political spectrum, it is likely that issues 
that lie at the heart of either extreme have a strong effect on Euroscepticism. While support for 
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redistribution is likely to be stronger amongst left-wing voters and vice-versa for opposition to 
immigration, the separate inclusion of these indicators enables us to asses their effects 
independently. In net-payer countries, we expect support for redistribution to be positively 
related to Instrumental Euroscepticism and EU Dissatisfaction, and negatively related to 
Political Euroscepticism and EU Opposition. However, in net-receiver countries, support for 
redistribution is expected to be positively related to all four dimensions of Euroscepticism. 
Opposition to immigration, on the other hand, is hypothesised to show a positive relationship 
with all dimensions in both net-payer and receiver countries. Citizens that fear multiculturalism 
and loss of identity are likely to blame the Eu for the effects of increased immigration that has 
already happened, as well as oppose further EU strengthening. 
As becomes clear from section two, one important determinant of Euroscepticism, 
especially instrumental and dissatisfaction, is some form of economic consideration. The 
connection between the economy and voter behaviour is at the heart of Political Economy and 
has been subject of investigation since its beginnings. Economic considerations can be based 
on perceptions or on objective facts, and they can refer to a respondent’s personal economic 
stance or the economic condition of his country. This results in four dimensions of economic 
theory, which are the respondent’s objective personal economic situation, his perception 
thereof, the objective state of his country’s economy, and again his perception. Furthermore, 
each dimension can be retrospective or prospective. Because of the multitude of possibilities 
and the different indicators available for all items we only present the ones that are applied in 
this paper. In accordance with previous research we expect economic anxiety, egocentric and 
sociotropic perceptions of the economy, to be positively related to all kinds of Euroscepticism, 
however more so to Instrumental Euroscepticism and EU Dissatisfaction. To capture a 
respondent’s objective personal economic situation we use his employment status and his 
employment class. The liberalisation of the market that goes hand in hand with European 
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integration benefits people that are relatively well endowed, while it hurts the others, according 
to human-capital theory (Gabel, 1998). Therefore, unemployed citizens are expected to be more 
Eurosceptic than those that have work. Concerning the impact of the objective state of the 
economy, the theory is not as unanimous as for the rest of economic theory. While good 
economic conditions are assumed to lead to an increase in support for an incumbant president 
or party, this is only the case when the is clarity of responsibility (Nadeau, Niemi and 
Yoshinaka, 2002). As Hellwig and Samuels (2007) show, globalisation leads voters to shift 
responsibility away from national governments, which might lead to an increased peceived 
responsibility of the EU. Therefore, if there is clarity, citizens in richer countries are expected 
to be less sceptic. One the other hand, poorer member states usually receive more from the EU 
budget than they pay in, while it is vice-versa for richer countries. Since we investigate net-
payer and receiver countries seperately, we pool the variation resulting from the EU budgetary 
status of a country in the two samples. 
However, since the EU is a supra-national construct that is neither a federal state nor a 
confederation, it is not reasonable to assume that citizens hold it in the same way responsible 
for the economic situation of their country as their national governments. This is one reason 
why the so called national identity theory has been found to be increasingly important in 
explaining Euroscepticism in most recent studies (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Van Elsaset al., 
2016; Magalhães, 2012b). The increasing scope of EU governance has cause citizens to fear 
losing their national identity. Political decisions made by the EU take away some of national 
sovereignt and consequently, citizens that feel strongly attached to their nation should be more 
eurosceptic than those that do not. This effect should be specifically strong for Political 
Euroscepticism and EU Opposition, because both refer to transferring more power to the EU. 
We expect both economic theory and national identity theory to bite in the way described above 
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in net payer as well as receiver countries, however, economic theory is expected to have a 
stronger effect in the latter and national identity theory in the former. 
Finally, we test wether partisan cues have a significant effect on Euroscepticism. Because 
of the increasing complexity of European issues it becomes more and more difficult for voters 
to form an informed opinion. When this is the case research has shown that people tend to 
follow some form of political authority when asked about these issues (De Vries and Edwards, 
2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). One such authority is the 
political party a citizen feels closely attached to as well as the general political environment in 
his country. A respondent that feels close to a party that opposes further European integration 
is expected to be more politically eurosceptic and stronger opposed further unification. On the 
other hand, partisanship with a party that believes its country’s membership in the EU is not 
beneficial is likely to cause a respondent to be more instrumentally Eurosceptic and dissatisfied. 
Furthermore, the average stance of parties in a specific country is expected to influence voters 
in that country that are not attached to a particular party. Since Political Euroscepticism is the 
most specific dimension that we are studying, we expect the respondent not to rely on political 
cues in his answer, while the other dimensions might be influenced.2 
 
4. Data & Variables 
4.1. Data 
The individual level data is retrieved from the European Electorate Study 2014 (EES). It was 
conducted after the European Parliament election in 2014 in all 28 member states of the 
European Union. 10 countries are classified as net-payer (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) and 18 as net-receiver countries 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
                                                 
2 See Table 1 of the appendix for a summary of the expectations in payer and receiver countries 
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Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). 
The survey includes observations on a total of 30,064 individuals which, in addition to the 
country level, are stratified by region per NUTS1 and NUTS2.  While NUTS2 comprises 183 
regions and NUTS1 only 94, this paper uses the latter, because the finer grained regional 
classification contains a substantial number of missing values. Country level data was taken 




The measure for Instrumental Euroscepticism is based on the answer to the question whether 
the respondent’s country’s membership in the EU is perceived to be 1 “A bad thing”, 2 “Neither 
good nor bad”, and 3 “A good thing”. In order to get a stable measurement of actual 
Euroscepticism, this variable was recoded into a binary variable, taking on the value 1 if the 
respondent thinks that membership is a bad thing and 0 otherwise. 
The second dependent variable measures Political Euroscepticism in the following way: 
in the EES respondents were asked to identify the most important issue facing their country at 
that moment. In the next question, they were asked at what level they think this issue is decided 
now and at what level it should be decided on in the future. The range goes from “Regional 
level” over “National level” to “European level”. From these answers a binary variable was 
created, taking on the value 1 if the respondent thinks that the issue should be decided at the 
regional or national level in the future. In all other cases, it takes on the value 0. 
In specifying the other two indicators of Euroscepticism we follow Van Elsas et al. 
(2016). The third measure captures the respondent’s dissatisfaction with the current state of the 
EU. The scale is constructed from two survey items, namely the statements “You trust the 
institutions of the EU” and “The European parliament takes into consideration the concerns of 
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European citizens” referring to the question “For each of the following statements, please tell 
me to what it extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion.”. The scale in both cases 
goes in four steps from “Yes, totally” to “No, not at all”. The two items were standardised and 
have a correlation of 0.63 and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78 which supports the assumption that 
the two represent one underlying scale. 
Finally, the last dependent variable measures the respondent’s support for or opposition 
to further European unification by relying in the question “European unification has gone too 
far or should be pushed further”. The answer is a scale from full support (0) to no support (10). 
 
Independent Variables 
The first three independent variables are our ideological measurements, left/right placement, 
support for redistributive policies, and opposition to immigration, all measured on a 0 to 10 
scale. Furthermore, a dummy variable is included that indicates whether a country is a net payer 
or receiver. 
The first economic independent variable is an index constructed from two survey items; 
one asking if the respondent or someone in his household has lost his job in the past 12 months 
and the other whether the respondent or someone in his household has experiences a decrease 
in income during the same time. The two items have a correlation of 0.46 and a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.63, which means that one can confidently assume that the two represent the same 
underlying factor. As (Van Elsas et al. (2016, p. 1189) put it “Combining items that load on the 
same theoretical sub-dimension, however, will imrpove the reliability and validity of the 
findings, […].”. To give a measure of a respondent’s objective economic situation we use a 
dummy variables for unemployment. The last item is a measure of sociotropic economic 
perceptions constructed from a retrospective and a prospective survey question (correlation 
0.62, alpha 0.76). 
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For national identity theory the measurement is the respondent’s attachment to his own 
nation and his attachment to the EU, measured on the same four step scale as described before 
for trust in the EU. Furthermore, a dummy for respondents with a feeling of exclusive national 
identity was constructed, which requires the lowest possible answer for attachment to the EU 
and at least three for national attachment to become 1. 
Lastly, there are two political and partisan cues. In case a respondent feels close to a 
certain party, both the EU integration and instrumental cue take on the average value experts 
have given that party in the CHES 2014. In case a respondent does not feel attached to any 
party, the country average value is assigned. 
All the specified models contain a set of demographic control variables which are age, 
gender, education (in four categories), and two social class dummies, one for manual workers 
and one for managers. Furthermore, two controls are added that measure political interest and 
political sophistication respectively. An individual with more knowledge of the political 
process can be expected to from more pronounced opinions on complicated matters, which in 
turn might affect his level of Euroscepticism. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
The paper employs multi-level mixed effects models to explain each of the four different 
dependent variables. Random effects are preferred over a pooled fixed effects approach, since 
they account for inter- and intra-class variation and can be adapted to specifically show the 
effects of each (see Bartels, 2008). Both Instrumental Euroscepticism and Political 
Euroscepticism are measured as binary variables, which is why a multi-level logistic model is 
employed. EU Dissatisfaction and EU Opposition, on the other hand, are measured on a ten-
point scale, so they are modelled with a multi-level linear regression. In all cases, there are three 
levels, individuals nested in regions and regions nested within countries. There is significant 
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variation at both the region and the country level for each independent variable. While EU 
Opposition shows no significant variation at the country-level in the three-level model, an LR 
test suggests that it is preferred over a model that only accounts for variance at the region-level 
(p = 0.000). This analysis was repeated for net-payer and receiver countries separately and there 
we also find significant variation at all levels (see appendix). 
Table 1 shows the four base models and the variance components of each level. Since in 




. Therefore, the country level accounts for approximately 7.3% of the variance 
in Model 1 and 3.83% in Model 2. Equivalently, the region level accounts for 2.43% and 2.13%. 
In Model 3 and Model 4 the figures are similar, 7.42% and 8.53% at the country level and 
2.26% and 1.52% at the region level, respectively. It becomes clear that, while there is 
significant variation between countries and regions, most of the variation in Euroscepticism is 
accountable to the individual level (90.27%, 94%, 90.31%, and 90.32%). 
After establishing significant random coefficients for all four models, we want to find out 
whether the relationships between ideology and the different dimensions hold that were put 
forward for net-payer and receiver countries. Table 2 shows the relationship between the four 
dimensions of Euroscepticism and left/right placement in net-payer countries. As expected, 
right-wing citizens are significantly more politically eurosceptic and more resistant to 
unification with the EU than left-wing citizens. What is striking, however, is that they are also 
significantly more politically eurosceptic and more dissatisfied with the EU. The form of the 
relationship is as hypothesised, with a curvilinear relationship between left/right placement and 
Instrumental Euroscepticism and EU Dissatisfaction on the one hand, and a positive linear 
relationship with Political Euroscepticism and EU Opposition. Although the square of ideology 
is weakly significant for the last dimension of scepticism, Figure 1 shows that the political left 
is certainly more supportive of unification than the voters at the centre. 
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Table 3 confirms that the political left is more eurosceptic on all four dimensions of 
Euroscepticism. There is, however, no evidence that the relationship between left/right 
placement, the political dimension, and opposition to unification has a curvilinear shape. Only 
Instrumental Euroscepticism seems to be higher on both political extremes, and interestingly in 
the model for EU Dissatisfaction the coefficient of the squared ideology term is highly 
significant and negative. Since by far most respondents place themselves at the political centre, 
as can be seen at the histogram in panel b of Figure 1, this means that the general public in net 
receiver countries is extremely dissatisfied with the EU. 
Table 4 shows the results for Instrumental Euroscepticism and EU Dissatisfaction in both 
categories. The first thing that jumps the eye is that the left is significantly less sceptic on both 
dimensions than the right in receiver countries. Support for redistributive policies is only 
significant for dissatisfaction and only in receiver countries, supporting the notion that this is 
particularly important issue in those countries. Opposition to immigration, on the other hand, is 
significant for both groups and dimensions. This supports our hypothesis that fear of 
multiculturalism and foreign influences increases negative sentiments towards the EU 
irrespective of the country. Concerning ideological standpoints, we can clearly say that a more 
“right-wing worldview” has a larger impact on the instrumental and dissatisfaction dimension 
in net-payer countries, than in receiver countries. 
The results for economic and identity theory are not as clear-cut as expected. First, we 
see that sociotropic considerations are generally a lot stronger than personal economic hardship, 
and unemployment status is insignificant altogether. Economic anxiety significantly increases 
both Instrumental Euroscepticism and EU Dissatisfaction, as hypothesised, but the effect on 
the instrumental dimension is a lot larger in both groups. What is unexpected is that the effects 
are generally more pronounced in payer countries, a finding that is probably due to the 
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curvilinear nature of the relation between these two dimensions of Euroscepticism and ideology 
in these countries.  
The double-edged character of national identity theory becomes apparent in the table. 
Many authors have argued that strong attachment to one’s nation increases attachment to the 
EU, while it is also true that nationalistic feelings provoke a negative reaction toward the EU 
(see Hooghe and Marks, 2005). In our sample attachment to one’s nation consistently decreases 
the instrumental and the dissatisfaction dimension, while exclusive national identity is 
significantly positive throughout, apart from Instrumental Euroscepticism in net payer 
countries. Overall the findings confirm the notion that these two dimensions of scepticism are 
affected by both economic and national identity considerations, but the former has a stronger 
effect. 
Finally, looking at the effect of political cues, we see that the clue on integration is 
significantly positive over all categories, while the instrumental cue is completely insignificant. 
Furthermore, it’s the effects are stronger in payer countries for both dimensions. This might be 
due to a stronger position of political parties on European issues, but ultimately this is a topic 
of further research. 
The results for Political Euroscepticism and EU Opposition are shown in Table 5. 
Left/right placement is significant and positive for both dimensions in payer countries, which 
supports the notion that in these countries it is mainly the political right that objects further 
political EU integration. The political left is significantly more opposed to further unification 
and support for redistributive policies is significantly positive for both dimensions. This lends 
support for the hypothesis that the political left in these countries is not only supposed to current 
EU anymore, but has also lost hope that it is an appropriate organism to put in place social 
policies favoured by them. Opposition to immigration is highly significant and positive for the 
opposition dimension, but has only a minor effect on Political Euroscepticism. This might be 
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due to the pooled nature of our measure of this dimension, which does not discern between 
different policies. 
The effect of the sociotropic item of economic theory is as expected weaker for the 
political dimension, but surprisingly stronger for opposition to further unification than for 
dissatisfaction in both payer and receiver countries. While this was expected in net-receiver 
countries, it shows that in both groups voters are making the EU responsible for the economic 
situation of their country, a fact that might lead to a further disillusionment of the political left. 
This is further supported by the fact that personal economic anxiety also increases opposition 
to unification. Furthermore, economic theory only has a significantly positive effect on the 
political dimension in receiver countries, as expected. 
National identity has a strongly positive impact on Political Euroscepticism and EU 
Opposition in net-payer countries, while exclusive national identity has no significant impact, 
meaning that those that feel strongly attached to their nation are no different from those that 
feel only attached to their nation and not the EU. This distinction becomes even clearer in net-
receiver countries where national identity is significantly positive for Political Euroscepticism, 
exclusive identity, however, increases the opposition dimension. These findings suggest that in 
rich European countries citizens that feel strongly nationalistic generally are more sceptic, while 
in poorer countries people the effect is stronger for those that feel attached to their nation and 
not to the EU, precisely because nationalism generally increases their attachment to the EU as 
well. 
Political cues are insignificant for Political Euroscepticism, as expected, which is likely 
because of the specific nature of the issues at hand here. As for the two dimensions of scepticism 
in Table 4, the instrumental cue is insignificant altogether. The integration cue, however is 
significantly positive for opposition to unification in both groups, showing that parties have a 
significant potential of influencing public opinion on this dimension. 
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6. Discussion & Conclusion 
We set out to find out how motivators of four dimensions of Euroscepticism differ in European 
countries that have a positive net balance with the EU and those that do not. To our knowledge, 
no direct comparison between these or any other groups of member states has been done so far, 
so our findings are the first to point out the immense differences that exist. The most surprising 
finding is that there is a clear distinction between the political groups that anti-European 
sentiments stem from. While in net-payer countries it is clearly the ideological right that is on 
the forefront of Euroscepticism, it is the left in net-receiver countries. More importantly, in the 
richer countries the left concentrates on opposition to the current EU, but in poorer countries it 
has appropriated all four dimensions. 
This points to serious difficulties for policy makers at the EU. In its early days, the union 
could count on conservative citizens to support it, because of the liberal market policies it 
represented. This support has already largely broken away in the richer countries, where 
conservatives now reject the EU based on identity and cultural considerations. While average 
Euroscepticism is still lower in poorer countries, our indicator for opposition to immigration 
shows that there is potential that opposition to the EU from the right-wing will increase in the 
future. When the disillusionment of the left continues in the Western and Northern countries of 
the EU, opposition from both ends of the political spectrum might be too strong to overcome. 
This study provides a starting point to investigate the differences in public opinion on 
European integration that could be taken into several directions. For once comparing how all 
four dimensions of Euroscepticism evolve in both groups over time is crucial, since opposition 
from the right is expected to rise in receiver countries. Our analysis is based on data from 2014 
and it is highly likely that scepticism has increased already, after the peak of the “refugee crisis” 
in 2015. Furthermore, the relationship between the willingness to transfer political power to the 
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Table 1 – Variance components 
 







EU Dissatisfaction EU Opposition 
Constant      -1.897*** 0.196** 2.552*** 5.318*** 
              (0.104) (0.078) (0.044) (0.182) 
Variance(country) 0.242*** 0.126*** 0.046*** 0.831 
              (0.078) (0.048) (0.014) (0.243) 
Variance(region) 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.014*** 0.148*** 
              (0.024) (0.019) (0.003) (0.040) 
Variance(residual)   0.560*** 8.760*** 
                (0.005) (0.078) 
Model         ME logistic ME logistic ME ML ME ML 
N(respondents) 25222 25222 25222 25222 
N(regions) 28 28 28 28 
N(countries)   94 94 94 94 
Log-Likelihood -9984.602 -16902.61 -28590.852 -63259.284 










Ideology      0.151*** 0.091*** 0.031*** 0.276*** 
              (0.031) (0.024) (0.008) (0.032) 
Ideology2 0.144*** -0.029 0.024*** 0.060* 
              (0.026) (0.020) (0.007) (0.027) 
Constant      -1.924*** 0.216 2.534*** 5.774*** 
              (0.160) (0.111) (0.062) (0.196) 
Model         ME logistic ME logistic ME ML ME ML 
N(respondents) 9181 9181 9181 9181 
N(regions) 56 56 56 56 
N(countries)   10 10 10 10 
Log-Likelihood -3673.47 -6192.037 -9982.649 -22311.04 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
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Table 3 – Net-receiver countries 
 










Ideology      -0.202*** -0.047** -0.088*** -0.148*** 
              (0.027) (0.018) (0.006) (0.026) 
Ideology2 0.060** 0.021 -0.023*** -0.024 
              (0.021) (0.014) (0.005) (0.020) 
Constant      -2.189*** 0.246* 2.508*** 4.952*** 
              (0.135) (0.103) (0.058) (0.229) 
Model         ME logistic ME logistic ME ML ME ML 
N(respondents) 12259 12259 12259 12259 
N(regions) 38 38 38 38 
N(countries)   18 18 18 18 
Log-Likelihood -4385.194 -8143.876 -13808.844 -31038.291 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
Variables 
Instrumental Euroscepticism EU Dissatisfaction 
Net-payer Net-receiver Net-payer Net-receiver 
Ideology             
Ideology         0.004 -0.111*** -0.011 -0.040*** 
                 (0.042) (0.033) (0.008) (0.006) 
Redistribution   -0.012 0.038 0.003 0.023*** 
                 (0.040) (0.034) (0.007) (0.006) 
Immigration      0.270*** 0.104** 0.062*** 0.017** 
                 (0.040) (0.034) (0.007) (0.006) 
Economic theory      
Economic anxiety 0.046 0.107** 0.042*** 0.019** 
                 (0.040) (0.035) (0.007) (0.006) 
Unemployed       0.099 0.125 -0.008 0.006 
                 (0.112) (0.096) (0.019) (0.018) 
National econ. perception 0.416*** 0.413*** 0.106*** 0.101*** 
                 (0.043) (0.036) (0.008) (0.007) 
Identity theory      
Attachment nation -0.023 -0.178*** -0.072*** -0.040** 
                 (0.070) (0.054) (0.015) (0.012) 
Attachment EU    -1.022*** -0.784*** -0.356*** -0.362*** 
                 (0.042) (0.037) (0.008) (0.007) 
Exclusive identity 0.053 0.285* 0.095** 0.089*** 
                 (0.153) (0.131) (0.031) (0.027) 
Political cues       
Party cue integration 0.416** 0.218* 0.072** 0.071*** 
 (0.161) (0.108) (0.025) (0.019) 
Party cue instrumental -0.053 0.059 0.02 0.015 
                 (0.146) (0.102) (0.024) (0.019) 




Table 5 – Political Euroscepticism and EU Opposition 
 
                 (0.290) (0.232) (0.053) (0.055) 
Controls         Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model            ME logistic ME logistic ME ML  ME ML  
N(respondents)   8561 10733 8561 10733 
N(regions) 56 38 56 38 
N(countries)   10 18 10 18 
Log-Likelihood   -2665.87 -3269.528 -7431.988 -9753.799 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
Variables 
Political Euroscepticism EU Opposition 
Net-payer Net-receiver Net-payer Net-receiver 
Ideology             
Ideology         0.064* -0.028 0.085** -0.076** 
                 (0.027) (0.020) (0.032) (0.028) 
Redistribution   -0.003 0.068** 0.034 0.083** 
                 (0.026) (0.021) (0.031) (0.029) 
Immigration      0.064* 0.015 0.571*** 0.262*** 
                 (0.025) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) 
Economic theory      
Economic anxiety 0.005 -0.02 0.102*** 0.064* 
                 (0.026) (0.022) (0.031) (0.030) 
Unemployed       0.036 0.094 0.003 -0.047 
                 (0.070) (0.061) (0.082) (0.085) 
National econ. perception 0.061* 0.138*** 0.289*** 0.262*** 
                 (0.028) (0.023) (0.033) (0.032) 
Identity theory      
Attachment nation 0.190*** 0.115** 0.257*** -0.071 
                 (0.055) (0.042) (0.065) (0.059) 
Attachment EU    -0.254*** -0.081*** -0.818*** -0.570*** 
                 (0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) 
Exclusive identity -0.149 0.066 0.011 0.278* 
                 (0.110) (0.092) (0.130) (0.129) 
Political cues       
Party cue integration 0.107 0.041 0.464*** 0.245** 
 (0.091) (0.064) (0.107) (0.091) 
Party cue instrumental -0.074 -0.019 -0.15 0.008 
                 (0.084) (0.064) (0.100) (0.091) 
Constant         -0.121 -0.255 5.881*** 4.646*** 
                 (0.182) (0.166) (0.238) (0.286) 
Controls         Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model            ME logistic ME logistic ME ML ME ML 
N(respondents)   8561 10733 8561 10733 
N(regions) 56 38 56 38 
N(countries)   10 18 10 18 
Log-Likelihood   -5681.047 -7015.003 -19775.631 -26701.254 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
